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Watching But Unseen? An Evaluation of the Transparency of the Online Presence of Integrity 
Commissioners in Ontario 
Abstract: 
The expected benefits of transparency in government, such as increased public engagement and 
trust, are well established. Transparency also enables a better accounting of elected officials by the 
public, but this accounting depends on having rules in place and someone responsible for enforcing 
those rules. The Ontario government took steps to provide this for local governments in Ontario 
when it permitted municipalities to create codes of conduct and to hire a municipal Integrity 
Commissioner to enforce those codes. However, the ultimate accountability is delivered by the 
voting public during municipal elections and, in order for this political accountability regime to be 
effective, it is essential that the public be informed of the activities of Integrity Commissioners so 
that they can make informed decisions at the ballot box. 
This research project assesses the online presence of Integrity Commissioners in Ontario’s largest 
municipalities to answer the question: How transparent are municipal Integrity Commissioners in 
Ontario? By quantifying the transparency of their activities, the research seeks to establish the 
extent to which Integrity Commissioners are likely to contribute to the expected benefits of 
transparency. It is found that the transparency varies widely across municipalities, and as a result 
the contribution that Integrity Commissioners can be expected to make in their communities 
remains unclear. Recommendations are made for a standardization of the online communication 
of Integrity Commissioners to ensure the best possible public use of the role. 
Subject keywords: Transparency, Accountability, Open Data 
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Accountability of elected officials is an important element of modern democracy. In order 
to be able to hold those representatives to account, however, the voting public needs to be aware 
of their activities so that they can make informed decisions on election day. The benefits of an 
informed public are not limited to accountability at the ballot box, however. A significant body of 
research has focused on transparency in government and the various contributions that 
transparency can make, such as increased public trust (Kassen, 2013) and confidence in 
government (da Cruz et al., 2016). An informed populace is also expected to be more engaged and 
be able to participate more actively in any accounting of government (Halachmi and Greiling, 
2013; Kassen, 2013). In a world of increasingly electronic engagement (Stedman, 2018) demanded 
by a public increasingly distrustful of opaque government processes (da Cruz et al., 2016)), the 
effectiveness of the ways in which the public is informed can play a significant role in how 
effective a government can be (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013).  
However, the opportunity for the public to hold governments to account in elections only 
comes around periodically. Is there any accountability in the interim? In Canada, arms-length 
officers of legislature have been created in order to provide some accounting of the behaviour of 
elected officials throughout their term. The Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario 
both established versions of accountability officers to ensure that elected officials conduct their 
business ethically (OCIEC, 2020) and to provide transparency and accountability in government 
(OICO, 2021). The roles that they are intended to play in terms of objectively assessing behaviour 





government predicted by the literature, but a similar role did not exist for local governments in 
Ontario until relatively recently. 
Municipalities in Ontario are created and empowered by the Municipal Act, 2001, and in 
2006 the Province of Ontario amended the Act to enable municipalities in Ontario to create their 
own codes of conduct that establish standards of behaviour elected officials and to appoint an 
Integrity Commissioner to enforce that code (Rust-d’Eye, 2011). Further amendments in 2018 
mandated these things for all municipalities in Ontario (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. 
223.3). The role of Integrity Commissioners was created to provide an accountability mechanism 
that not only enforces codes of conduct but also to provide a resource that educates elected officials 
about their obligations under those codes, and their work is to be made available to the public 
(Rust-d’Eye, 2011). 
In theory, this disclosure of information regarding councillor behaviour by Integrity 
Commissioners allows the public to hold locally elected officials accountable for their actions 
while in office (Sancton, 2017), but the effectiveness of the communication, a key element of 
transparency of government, also plays a significant role in the contribution it can be expected to 
make (Cucciniello and Nasi, 2014). What becomes apparent, however, is that the way in which 
Integrity Commissioner work in Ontario is reported and published varies significantly. For 
example, accessing the City of Ottawa’s website requires only two well-labelled links from the 
home page (“Open, Transparent and Accountable Government” and “Integrity Commissioner”) to 
lead directly to a webpage containing Integrity Commissioner reports, contact information and 
clear descriptions of the Integrity Commissioner’s mandate and how to access the office, as well 





requires only slightly more obscure navigation but leads to a page that contains the only complaints 
process and a link to the code of conduct, with no reports or any other accounting of the activities 
of the Integrity Commissioner. Even the identity of the Integrity Commissioner is missing and is 
only revealed on the complaints form. Considering the importance of municipal websites to the 
transparency of local governments, this variability of online content then begs the question: if 
Integrity Commissioners and their work are not consistently communicating effectively to the 
public, is it possible to say that the role of Integrity Commissioner is contributing equally in all 
municipalities to the public’s ability to participate in local government and hold their elected 
officials to account?  
This research paper will be an evaluation that seeks to quantify the communication element 
of the contribution that Integrity Commissioners are currently making to local governments. 
Specifically, it will answer the question: How transparent are municipal Integrity Commissioners 
in Ontario? To that end, a review of the relevant literature will describe how transparency of 
communication by Integrity Commissioners is expected to contribute to accountability in local 
government. This research will then be applied to the online presence of select Integrity 
Commissioners in order to establish how likely it is that the voting public is benefiting from the 
expense of employing these agents of accountability.  
An evaluation of the transparency of the role of municipal Integrity Commissioner is 
important to the study of local government in Ontario because in many ways it speaks directly to 
public trust (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013)). Developing a better understanding of how the 
transparency of current practices could be improved will enable municipalities, through their 





consideration of the complexity of the issue of accountability in local government that this 
evaluation of the efficacy of the Integrity Commissioner role in Ontario will be pursued. Rather 
than attempting to evaluate how effective the role is at increasing the accountability of local 
government, the research instead focuses on how it can be expected to contribute to that goal. It is 
therefore considered a useful contribution to the literature to compare and contrast how various 
municipalities have implemented the mandatory office of Integrity Commissioner, distinguishing 
them based on how well they communicate their function and products to the public. 
The paper is presented in four sections. The first section reviews relevant academic theories 
related to transparency and accountability in government. The second section briefly describes the 
history of accountability officers in Canada and Ontario in order to provide context for Ontario’s 
municipal Integrity Commissioners. The third section develops an analytical framework for 
operationalizing the online content of Integrity Commissioner webpages and presents an analysis 
of the results. Finally, the fourth section provides recommendations for improvements to the 
Integrity Commissioner role that could enhance the transparency of the office, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that they can contribute to goals of accountability for elected representatives in local 
government. 
Section One: What does the literature say about transparency in local 
government? 
Conceived as an agent of accountability in local government (Hardeman, 2006), the 
municipal Integrity Commissioner in Ontario was intended to ensure that citizens are well 





sometimes overused terms like transparency and accountability apply to how municipal Integrity 
Commissioners can contribute to effective governance in Ontario municipalities? This section 
explores some theoretical concepts that can be useful in evaluating these contributions, starting 
with the focus of this research: transparency. 
Transparency 
In order for the public to contribute effectively to government decision making, some form 
of access to much of the same information that decision makers have is necessary (Kassen, 2013), 
and an availability of government information to the public to enable discourse and assessment is 
viewed as a way to enable the public to hold their government to account (Lyons and Spicer, 2018). 
In their review of the adoption of open government features in American local governments, 
Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch (2012) provide a concise definition of transparency “as the 
disclosure of information by an organization that enables external actors to monitor and assess its 
internal workings and performance” (p. 563), which seems an appropriate perspective from which 
to view the contribution that transparent municipal Integrity Commissioners can make.  
Trends in the United States towards open government under the Obama administration led 
to a significant amount of research on the topic of e-government initiatives. The transparency 
provided by a shift to open data regimes there has been celebrated as an opportunity for promoting 
civic engagement and public trust in government (Kassen, 2013). Efficiency of government was 
also cited as a potential benefit of open data and transparency (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013), 
particularly as a result of the discourse that it could generate in a better-informed electorate 





there is rarely a result that all observers would find equally satisfactory, it becomes apparent that 
transparency is related more to process in government than it is necessarily to results (Ball, 2009). 
However, simply disclosing information is not sufficient for generating the type of useful 
engagement that the literature suggests is possible. The information that is shared must be useful 
to the consumer in order to achieve transparency (Cucciniello and Nasi, 2014; Fox, 2007). Not 
only that, leveraging the media forums that a majority of society favours (internet content, social 
media) is also an essential component of effective transparency in the modern era (Stedman, 2018). 
Considerations such as these form part of the distinction between mandatory disclosure and true, 
purposeful transparency, which is an important distinction that must be considered when 
evaluating the transparency of a role like the municipal Integrity Commissioner. 
While society increasingly demands that governments be transparent, certain aspects of the 
work of government do require some element of secrecy. Accordingly, the provincial and federal 
governments in Canada are permitted to conduct vast amounts of their business behind closed 
doors. However, this option is significantly curtailed in local governments in Ontario. The 
Municipal Act, 2001 does allow municipal councils to go in camera to debate issues behind closed 
doors in specific instances where the information discussed must be kept private. However, those 
instances are very closely prescribed and the vast majority of the work that municipal councils 
undertake must be conducted in forums that are open to the public (Municipal Act, 2001).1  
Even agents of accountability and transparency are subject to the same limitations. Just as 
some municipal business must remain behind closed doors, so too must some of the work of the 
 
1 From this perspective it has been argued that local government is already the most transparent level of government 





Integrity Commissioner. For example, transparency of process was at the heart of an Integrity 
Commissioner investigation into the conduct of then-Deputy Mayor Michael DiBiase in the City 
of Vaughan (MacEwan, 2018). DiBiase was, among other things, accused of contravening 
Vaughan’s code of ethics by manipulating a procurement process and attempting to influence staff 
in relation to a construction contract award. There were also allegations that DiBiase threatened 
reprisals against those who testified against him (ibid.). In a case like this, the need to protect the 
identity of the witnesses is obvious. DiBiase requested a judicial review of the investigation 
process, contending, in part, that he was not afforded due process due to the secrecy of the 
investigation undertaken by the Integrity Commissioner, but the court unanimously supported the 
level of secrecy employed and rejected the appeal (ibid.).  
Notwithstanding the need to protect certain information, the contribution that transparency 
can make to an engaged public is clearly supported by the literature (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013), 
and current models of public service are becoming increasingly oriented to public engagement and 
empowerment (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2015). However, even though transparency is considered 
an essential element of democracy that contributes to engagement, it does not necessarily 
guarantee that those in power will behave appropriately. Transparency in government must 
therefore inform other mechanisms in order to generate some level of accountability on the part of 
elected officials. 
Accountability 
Accountability is a frequently used term, but what does it actually mean in a local 
government context, and how is it linked to transparency? Generally speaking, in electing 





their individual lives in the interest of security and stability. This relationship is described as one 
of agency: Elected officials and the electorate participate in a “principal-agent” arrangement 
whereby the elected officials exercise powers delegated to them by the voting public (Lyons and 
Spicer, 2018). 
Any delegation of power and control also comes with opportunities for abuse, and past 
instances of that abuse led to the creation of early ethics commissions at the turn of the 20th century, 
with reforms continuing through the 1960s and 1970s (Smith, 2003). Often, these types of reforms 
are implemented in response to specific scandals involving abuses of power in government (ibid.). 
As evidenced by the recent creation of municipal Integrity Commissioners in Ontario, reforms 
continue to this day. Considering the prevalence throughout history of abuses of power by 
governments of various forms and stripes, it is reasonable for the principal in governmental 
relationships (the voting public) to want some means of holding their agents to account for their 
actions while in positions of delegated power. 
In their exploration of a link between transparency and accountability, Halachmi and 
Greiling (2013) describe that an accountability of the agent to the principal depends on certain 
things: “First, the party requesting the accounting can affect when and how the account is provided. 
Second, there are real, as different from symbolic, consequences for any failure to comply with 
the said request. Third, the content or substance of the account can be used by the requesting party 
as a justification for action that would influence the future status or performance of the party that 
is asked to give the account” (p. 566). The role of transparency in government in this accountability 





accounting of behaviour, the third condition clearly carries no weight if the information available 
to the public is obscure or incomplete. 
At the same time, focusing accountability efforts on “credit and blame” narratives has the 
potential to obscure the benefits that transparent disclosure and discussion can provide for true 
accountability to an informed public (Anderson, 2009). Accountability regimes also carry with 
them the risk that overly restrictive practices will remove the ability of individuals to apply 
discretion to specific situations or stifle innovation (ibid.) and auditing a government in real-time 
has the potential to heighten this environment. Not only that, such audits have been characterized 
as “transfers of institutional power to audit bodies who decide on a wide range of issues and who, 
by definition, overstep their purely auditing jurisdiction to become de facto policy makers” (Power, 
2007; p. 9). Research into Canadian federal parliamentary officers has identified similar concerns 
about over-reach of accountability mandates (Bergman and MacFarlane, 2018). 
Notwithstanding the risks associated with an over-zealous pursuit of accountability, an audit 
function clearly provides an opportunity for informed public discourse if the investigations are 
conducted with transparency and the results are made publicly available. Transparency in this 
instance enhances the accountability mandate and also mitigates concerns about over-reach of the 
audit function by putting more of the power for accountability into the hands of the public. 
Municipal Integrity Commissioners are clearly well positioned to leverage this audit role into 
enhanced accountability through active and purposive transparency.  
Transparency and Political Accountability 
As described, accountability in principal-agent relationships is important. Further to 





influencing the “future status or performance” of the agent (p.566), a discussion of principal-agent 
accountability by Lyons and Spicer (2018) described it generally as consisting of three phases: 
“information, discussion and consequences” (p. 182), which more closely resembles the 
accountability mechanism embodied by the electoral process. Information is provided to the 
electorate in the form of a candidate’s past performance and priorities for the next electoral term 
(the platform). This information is then discussed by the candidates and the voting public in various 
forums (the campaign). The process culminates on election night when the results of the election 
deliver consequences to the candidates, either positive or negative. However, it becomes clear that 
without a reliable and accessible source of information, the accounting on election night can be 
expected to be incomplete. It is here that transparency of local government can be seen to 
contribute directly to political accountability, assuming that the public acts on the information they 
receive (Ball, 2009). 
For local governments in Ontario, the opportunity to hold elected officials accountable for 
their actions in this way comes every four years (Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c.32, 
s. 4 (1)). The obvious question that results from an accountability regime that relies on political 
accountability (electoral results) alone for its enforcement is whether or not an accounting every 
four years is sufficient considering the importance of this particular principal-agent relationship.2 
It is also worthwhile to consider how prevalent misconduct actually is. Valerie Jepson (2018), the 
former Integrity Commissioner for the City of Toronto, observed while in that role that elected 
officials typically tried to avoid contravening the code of conduct, and further that she approached 
 
2 The municipal Integrity Commissioner does play a non-executive role in the punitive aspects of this accountability 





her work from the perspective “that elected officials who volunteer to run for public office are 
people of good will and intention” (p. 47).  
Considering the relative infrequency of councillor transgressions and also of opportunities 
for accountability, perhaps it is more important to ensure that the electoral accounting, when it 
does occur, is being delivered by a sufficiently informed and sufficiently large portion of the 
population, rather than focusing on the need for immediate repercussions for improper behaviour. 
The availability of a resource like the municipal Integrity Commissioner to review and report on 
activities during the term allows for scrutiny within electoral cycles. Ensuring that those reports 
are available when the election begins provides the necessary information to voters when they 
need it. By providing transparent public access to files such as these during a term the government 
not only becomes presumably more transparent but also more efficient as it could promote civic 
engagement by enabling citizens to participate in various discussions on how to better address their 
needs (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013; Kassen, 2013). 
Despite the multiplicity of research extolling the virtues of transparency, it is certainly not a 
foregone conclusion that enhanced transparency in government will lead to better-informed voters 
and increased civic engagement. Some have gone so far as to debate the basic assumption that 
there is any substantial link between transparency and accountability at all (Fox, 2007). Analysis 
of Integrity Commissioner work in Ontario seemed to support this view when it identified no 
significant correlation between the occurrence of complaints against councillors and election 
results in local government elections (Arbuckle, 2018). Even the benefits of transparency of 





things, an increase in unjustified blaming activity by the public and unnecessary challenges to 
government activity (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013).  
However, as Gingras notes: “although the public sphere is neither rational nor transparent, it 
nevertheless is a place for debates about public issues. Information is considered vital to 
democracy” (2012: p. 223). Further, Sancton, (2017), Jepson (2018) and others have identified a 
contribution to political accountability as an essential role that Integrity Commissioners can play 
in local government in Ontario. Finally, a substantial body of literature shows a relationship 
between transparency, accountability and public trust in local government, and even further that 
technologically focused means of communication and disclosure can play a significant role in that 
relationship (da Cruz et al., 2016). An engaged electorate, debating readily available information 
on the business of government, is therefore considered an essential part of political accountability 
and true representational government. 
The behaviour of municipal councils can have an immense impact on the business of local 
governments and, while election night provides the ultimate opportunity to hold elected officials 
accountable for their actions while in office, that mechanism clearly has limitations. For example, 
the landslide re-election mayor Mike Bradley in Sarnia in 2018 despite multiple well-publicized 
allegations of workplace harassment is theorized to have led to a mass exodus of senior 
administrators in that City (Kula, 2018; 2019).  Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the role 
that transparency plays in engaging the public, and whether or not it actually leads to enhanced 
accountability, if an accountability officer is to hold an already transparent government to account 
it would seem appropriate that that officer should aspire to at least the same ideals of transparency. 





demonstrable and accountability mechanisms are not enforceable” (p. 884). The literature 
demonstrates that by enhancing the transparency of accountability officers, their ability to 
contribute to the accountability of local governments should also be enhanced, and therefore an 
assessment of how transparent Integrity Commissioners in Ontario are contributes to the study of 
that role in local government. 
Section Two: How are governments accountable to residents of Ontario? 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that ensuring accountability in government through 
transparency is a complex task, especially in a local government context. Before we consider the 
relatively recent development of the Integrity Commissioner model in Ontario, it is useful to 
consider how accountability in government is pursued at the senior levels of government in order 
to understand the environment in which the Integrity Commissioner was conceived. 
Predecessors of Municipal Integrity Commissioners in the Federal and Provincial 
Governments 
The Governments of Canada and Ontario both have established offices for accountability of 
elected officials. The Government of Canada has established the Office of the Conflict of Interest 
and Ethics Commissioner (OCIEC) as “an independent Officer of Parliament who is responsible 
for administering the Conflict of Interest Act for public office holders and the Conflict of Interest 
Code for Members of the House of Commons” (OCIEC, 2020). There has been a progression of 
roles and mechanisms for accountability of elected officials in the federal government starting in 
1973, with the current incarnation being created in 2004 (OCIEC, 2021). The Ethics Commissioner 





to the House of Commons rather than to the Prime Minister. Similar to the federal government, 
the Ontario provincial government established the Office of the Integrity Commissioner (OICO) 
“as an independent ethics leader, working to encourage and support high ethical standards that 
strengthen trust and confidence in the Ontario government. As an Officer of the Legislative 
Assembly, the Integrity Commissioner is independent of government.” (OICO, 2021). 
Pertinent to a discussion about Integrity Commissioners in Ontario, a significant change to 
the federal accountability regime occurred in 1985 when the Government of Canada adopted a 
code of conduct3 rather than simply pursuing a rules-based approach (Kernaghan, 2007).  One key 
difference between a code of conduct and a rules-based system is that a code of conduct sets out 
general standards of behaviour and values that are expected (Kernaghan, 1997) without the need 
for all transgressions to be individually defined. If councillor behaviour was governed by a rules-
based system, any conflicts of interest or misbehaviour would need to be specifically identified 
and demonstrated to be contrary to that rule. In a code of conduct system, shades of grey are 
introduced which then open the door for important concepts in governmental accountability such 
as apparent conflicts of interest (Jepson, 2018). This seems to be the more appropriate model given 
that the accountability of elected officials is largely constructed on subjective values like ethics 
and service of the public interest (Kernaghan, 1997). 
That is not to say that these codified values cannot be defined; in fact they have been referred 
to as a “bedrock of organizational culture” (Kernaghan, 1997: p. 44). Rather, because there is some 
 
3 Conflict of Interest and Post-Employment Code for Public Office Holders was created in 1985 in response to 
frequent conflict of interest allegations in government, even though the government of the day did not accept the 





subjectivity to these elements, frequent modifications of the code can be avoided despite 
successive councils with differing world views. Kernaghan notes that “the single greatest 
advantage of a code of ethics is the measure of certainty it provides for standards of ethical conduct 
expected from public servants” (1980: p. 218). If codes of conduct were to be modified frequently, 
their power is therefore diminished. If leaders break those codes, their ability to lead is also 
weakened (Ford and Ford, 2010). Ironically, then, the ability of codes of conduct in government 
to reliably guide the behaviour of those elected officials subject to it relies in no small part on the 
honesty and integrity of those same leaders. It turns out that this irony is directly applied in the 
accountability regime introduced for municipalities in Ontario. 
Accountability in Local Government in Ontario 
In Canada, municipalities are “creatures of the province”, which means that local 
governments derive their power solely from their provincial government, and only to the extent 
that the province decides (Sancton, 2015). In Ontario, many of these powers are now provided 
generally with only process being prescribed (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c.25), which 
enhances municipal autonomy (Sancton, 2015). However, this newly found autonomy still is not 
absolute, and the Province of Ontario has periodically demonstrated a willingness to unilaterally 
exercise its absolute control over municipalities.4 
Because municipalities only exist under enabling legislation from the Province, imposing 
standards of behaviour upon municipal councillors can still be seen as a function generally falling 
 
4 As a recent example, the City of London had successfully implemented ranked balloting for the 2016 municipal 
election, and other municipalities had voted to follow suit. The Province used an omnibus COVID-19 measures bill 
to remove a municipality’s ability to select an alternative election model despite little expressed support from 





under the jurisdiction of the Province. What then prompted the provincial government to consider 
some sort of locally empowered accountability officer for Ontario municipalities? In 2001, a 
scandal surfaced in the City of Toronto, revealing substantial abuses of power and conflicts of 
interest related to the procurement of leased computers and tax collection software in the preceding 
decade (Fernando, 2007). The scale of the abuses and the length of time over which they were 
perpetrated warranted a judicial inquiry. The inquiry was presided over by Justice Denise E. 
Bellamy beginning in late 2002 and culminated in the release of the Bellamy Report in 2005 (ibid.). 
The Bellamy Report contained many recommendations for measures that should be taken by the 
City of Toronto specifically, and other Ontario municipalities generally, in order to avoid similar 
scandals in the future. The resultant amendments to the Municipal Act, 2001 in 2006 (through Bill 
130, the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006) implemented some of the 
recommendations, including the authority of municipal council to establish codes of conduct for 
councillors and board members and the authority to hire an independent Integrity Commissioner 
(Rust-d’Eye, 2011). At the time, the appointment of an Integrity Commissioner was only mandated 
for the City of Toronto, but further amendments to the Municipal Act, 2001 (through Bill 68, the 
Modernizing Ontario’s Municipal Legislation Act, 2017) have now required it of all Ontario 
municipalities (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, s. 223.3). Generally speaking, Integrity 
Commissioners are expected to provide an independent source of advice and review regarding the 
actions of municipal councillors and board members (Rust-d’Eye, 2011). Integrity Commissioners 
can only make findings and recommendations for sanction against council members who are found 





those sanctions or others (Municipal Act, 2001, S.O 2001, s. 223.4 (5)). This is the irony of the 
system alluded to earlier, whereby municipal councillors are in effect expected to police each other. 
What makes the 2006 amendments to the Municipal Act, 2001 in 2006 significant is that 
they allowed for the creation of codes of conduct for municipal councillors by the municipalities 
themselves (Alcantara et al., 2012). Enabling the creation of a code of conduct by municipalities 
is effectively a delegation of a portion of the Province’s jurisdiction over Ontario’s municipalities. 
As previously described, codes of conduct are often vague and deal with constructs of behaviour 
that are better described as values rather than rules (Kernaghan, 1997), and also allow for broader 
interpretations for accountability in local government (Jepson, 2018). Leaving the development of 
the code of conduct up to local governments allows them to set expectations and norms that suit 
their community and mandate, which is one of the reasons that codes of conduct are seen as more 
agile and better suited to the current political environment in Ontario (AMCTO, 2017). 
Interestingly, this autonomy to develop a code of conduct was then subsequently mandated for all 
municipalities through amendments enacted in 2018 (Bill 68, the Modernizing Ontario’s 
Municipal Legislation Act, 2017), suggesting that only a limited number of municipalities actually 
chose to take on this accountability role for themselves.  
It is perhaps misleading to identify the Bellamy Report as the justification for the municipal 
Integrity Commissioner role in Ontario as Fernando (2007), Sancton (2017), Jepson (2018) and 
others have done. Notwithstanding that the need for an Integrity Commissioner was laid out in the 
Bellamy Report, the findings heavily implicated members of the administration. Since Integrity 
Commissioners can only investigate the actions of elected officials and recommend sanctions, the 





independent watchdog in local government falls well short of being considered a solution to the 
problems unearthed by Justice Bellamy. It might be more appropriate to identify it as the beginning 
of discussions at the provincial level around accountability mechanisms in local government and 
how those goals might be achieved. Nevertheless, an impartial third party that can investigate and 
offer public recommendations to council specifically related to questionable conduct shortly after 
it occurred can only be seen as contributing the accountability of elected officials in local 
government, even if it does not necessarily result in electoral repercussions. 
It becomes apparent that a review of the ways in which Integrity Commissioners can 
contribute to the accountability of local governments is a useful exploration rather than focusing 
on the delivery of accountability itself. The literature suggests that transparency in government is 
increasingly demanded and expected by the public (Stedman, 2018), and that it can contribute to 
accountability (Ball, 2009) even if the level of contribution is not necessarily clear (Fox, 2007). 
Further, municipal websites have also been shown to be a key component of the transparency of 
local government and engagement of the public (da Cruz et al., 2016). Accordingly, the remainder 
of this research paper will be focused on establishing a means of measuring and comparing the 
transparency of selected Integrity Commissioner webpages, which can perhaps serve as a gateway 
to further research into the contributions that Integrity Commissioners make to local government 





Section 3 - How transparent are municipal Integrity Commissioners in 
Ontario? 
If one were to evaluate the role that the Integrity Commissioner plays in local government 
in Ontario, a logical first step would be an analysis of the types of complaints received and any 
reports and sanctions that resulted. Indeed, the original intent of this research was to do just that. 
However, to truly evaluate the effectiveness of an accountability regime, it would be necessary to 
pursue an in-depth review of the activity of Integrity Commissioners, the content of their reports, 
the resulting sanctions, the frequency of repeat offenders, and the impacts of sanctions on election 
results to build on previous research such as that completed by Arbuckle (2018). In reality, such a 
study would also be somewhat incomplete without interviews to establish the environment in 
which the investigations were conducted, and the underlying reasons for the Integrity 
Commissioners’ recommendations and subsequent council decisions. Nevertheless, if robust data 
collection for the entire population were possible, statistical analysis could prove enlightening. 
Unfortunately, this data collection proved to be a monumental effort delivering very little in the 
way of useful information for many reasons: 
 The number of municipalities in Ontario (444) coupled with the absence of a centralized 
repository of Integrity Commissioner reports makes data collection very labour 
intensive; 
 Many municipalities do not post Integrity Commissioner annual reports online, 





 Many municipal accountability policies and bylaws only require those investigations 
that are reported to Council to be made public, and since many annual reports were also 
not published it is impossible to discern whether there were no investigations or if the 
reports simply needed to be requested; 
 There is a significant diversity of the quality and form of reporting across all 
municipalities. 
The inconsistency of reporting across municipalities would make any sort of all-
encompassing data collection and analysis very difficult. Case studies could be informative, but 
the variability noted would make any generalizations as to the overall effectiveness of the 
municipal Integrity Commissioner difficult to support. Indeed, how can one compare the effects 
of a provincially mandated function across municipalities when the basic elements of the 
implementation of that function are so inconsistent? What results then is an impression that the 
transparency and public information goals of the Integrity Commissioner are not being universally 
met, and that perhaps an evaluation of the communication of Integrity Commissioner materials is 
a more meaningful (and measurable) initial contribution to make to the body of research in this 
area.  
As a result, this research project focuses on comparing how the activities and findings of 
Integrity Commissioners are being communicated across Ontario municipalities, specifically 
online, through the lens of transparency in local government and focused on the dissemination of 
information through municipal websites. The main premise of this line of evaluation is that, in 
order for the role of Integrity Commissioner to contribute in any meaningful way to accountability 





transparent way so that it can help inform election-day decisions. This approach, assessing 
transparency through a review of website content, mirrors the approach that da Cruz et al. took 
when assessing the transparency of Portuguese local government webpages (2016). In that 
research, the research team developed a means of calculating a ‘Municipal Transparency Index’ 
for each municipality based on observations from a given municipality’s website (ibid.: pp. 876-
878). 
While da Cruz et al. (2016) used focus groups to establish evaluation criteria and weightings, 
due to limitations of time and budget no focus groups were convened for this research project. 
Instead, the literature review and a review of the legislated role of Integrity Commissioners was 
used to establish a list of priorities for effective communication to the public. Very generally, those 
priorities are that the public: understands the basic elements of the role of a municipal Integrity 
Commissioner; knows how to make use of that office; and, most critically, has easy access to the 
Integrity Commissioner’s work so that they can see the results of the role and assess its 
contribution. By comparing how Integrity Commissioner information from the largest upper and 
lower tier municipalities in Ontario is made available to the public through their websites, and 
whether or not that information is useful in the ways described, we take one further step toward 
assessing if municipal Integrity Commissioners can be perceived as meeting the goals of 
transparency and accountability that the Province, and many of those same municipalities’ 
websites, claim to pursue.  
Research Design 
Assessing transparency is not a binary task. One cannot simply review a website and then 





of reasons for a website to be lacking in certain regards, and the ability to draw broad conclusions 
about governmental intent is therefore significantly hindered. Municipalities vary significantly in 
terms of size, financial and administrative capacity, community needs and even the communication 
preferences of the electorate. As Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch observe: “Because transparency is 
a potentially costly or complex dimension of e-government, its development and implementation 
may depend on the capacity of the government in which it is situated” (2012: p. 564). 
In consideration of these compounding limitations, the research design required a refinement 
of the sample population. A basic assumption that had to be made was that larger populations bring 
with them additional financial and/or administrative capacity and are more likely to rely on 
electronic or virtual means for communication and civic engagement. Accordingly, thresholds for 
selecting a sample population from the 444 Ontario municipalities were set as follows: lower and 
single tier municipalities with populations greater than 150,000 (of which there are fifteen); and 
upper tier municipalities with populations greater than 300,000 (of which there are seven).5 These 
thresholds were arbitrarily selected, with the primary goal being to control for impacts related to 
financial means. In order to be able to draw conclusions based on the results of this research, these 
larger centres were assumed to have access to sufficient operating budgets and/or the technical 
wherewithal to allow for effective communication via their own websites. A review of the 
published operating budgets for the smallest upper and lower tier municipalities on the list (Simcoe 
County and the City of Oshawa respectively) supports this assumption.6 More specific to this 
 
5 Populations based on 2016 Canada Census data. 
6 The 2019 Financial Information Reports identified the general government operating budgets for both Simcoe 
County and the City of Oshawa as $37M. Those budgets exclude any service or program delivery, and the cost of 





research, it is further assumed that municipalities of this size are unlikely to experience any 
significant barrier to making information easily available over the internet, which is supported by 
the academic literature reviewed (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012; da Cruz et al., 2016, 
Stedman, 2018).  If this is the case, then any identified deficiencies with regard to transparency 
can be assumed to be as a result of either the performance of their appointed Integrity 
Commissioner or the municipality’s approach to, procurement of, and terms of employment for 
the role. Given that these would both be rational decisions made by a person or body in a position 
of public trust, an assessment of the transparency of their actions is appropriate. 
This case selection method does not differentiate between the two primary means of 
providing Integrity Commissioner services (in-house or third party), since ultimately it is the 
municipality’s responsibility to manage its own accountability regime and ensure compliance with 
the requirements of the Municipal Act, 2001. The twenty-two municipalities reviewed displayed a 
variety of Integrity Commissioner models, with one-third of the single or lower tier municipalities 
employing an in-house Integrity Commissioner while the remaining two-thirds employed third 
parties to provide this service.  
Table 1 - Integrity Commissioner Model Distribution 
 Number In-House Third-Party 
Lower/Single Tier 
(pop. > 150,000) 
15 5 10 
Upper Tier  
(pop. > 300,000) 
7 0 7 
 
On the surface there should be no compelling reason why either model would be any better 
than the other at delivering transparency. Nevertheless, the quality of information related to the 





between and within both regimes, and the ease with which the public can obtain that information 
is shown to be equally inconsistent. Since similar transparency across municipalities is not a given, 
and yet is generally agreed to be an essential contributor to the political process, what is needed is 
an objective way to compare them (da Cruz et al., 2016). 
Scoring Transparency 
While the concept of transparency in government is easy to understand generally, there are 
multiple aspects of the perception of transparency that make developing a quantitative way to 
measure it much more complex (da Cruz et al., 2016). In order to operationalize a subjective 
characteristic like transparency in such a way as to permit a comparative analysis, a defined scoring 
system is required. 
Even though some have identified an absence of analytical frameworks for evaluating 
transparency and accountability (Lourenco, 2015), there have been several models developed in 
order to score the transparency of government, either generally through an open data lens 
(Veljkovic et al., 2014), or specific to online content available on government websites 
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012; da Cruz et al., 2016). In essence, local government webpages 
like those for Integrity Commissioners in Ontario can be seen as a unique subset of the open data 
movement in government. The goals identified in both cases are similar, and mirror the benefits 
of transparency identified in the literature review. The availability of information online 
contributes to an informed, engaged and more trusting citizenry (Halachmi and Greiling, 2013; 
Veljkovic et al., 2014; da Cruz et al., 2016). 
However, it is also clear that not all information is equally important, and that the act of 





is presented also matters (Veljkovic et al., 2014), as does the quality (Fox, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen 
and Welch, 2012; da Cruz et al., 2016). Therefore, the various areas of interest relating to online 
Integrity Commissioner content should not necessarily be weighted equally when assessing the 
transparency of that local government office, and a need for some consideration for individual 
weighting becomes apparent. The general categories for transparency that were established 
consider to what extent a municipality’s webpage allows the reader to: understand the role of 
Integrity Commissioner; know how to make use of the Integrity Commissioner; and have easy 
access to the Integrity Commissioner’s work. The models for transparency previously discussed 
can be applied to each in order to establish an appropriate system of weightings. 
Scoring systems developed by researchers are invariably customized to the goals of their 
research, so there is often limited direct transferability to be exploited in order to develop specific 
lists of evaluation criteria and appropriate weighting. However, scoring systems developed for 
open data in general perhaps hold potential for guiding this research project. The scoring system 
designed by Veljkovic et al. (2014) for assessing open government through the lens of open data 
assigned the following relative weights to various categories of open data environment 
characteristics:  
 The presence of a basic data set = 15%; 
 Data openness (the quality of the data) = 33%; 
 Transparency (the utility and reliability of the data) = 26%; 
 Participation = 13%; and 





Even though the latter two indices are important to the role of Integrity Commissioner overall, 
they are somewhat immaterial to the goal of this research and can be discounted. However, the 
first three measures appear to be appropriate given the preceding research findings, and so will be 
retained as a starting point for the analysis, retaining the relative weightings assigned. 
Similar to Veljkovic et al., da Cruz et al. (2016) avoided providing an equal weighting to the 
criteria they developed for their Municipal Transparency Index. Working with an expert focus 
group, they developed a list of transparency categories, each with a distinct number of ‘indicators’ 
(ibid.). Each indicator was then scored individually based on clear criteria that established what 
content would obtain a given score (ibid.). As expected, the scoring system developed was too 
specific to overall transparency of local government to be directly applicable to this research. 
However, one important consideration that was included in this model was the concept that, in 
attempting to establish objective scoring systems for subjective qualities, there should be some 
consideration for the relative importance of the individual criterion to the overall score (the concept 
of “trade-off”), rather than scoring based solely on the absolute qualities of an individual criterion 
in isolation (ibid.: p. 881). In addition, a noted limitation of their work was the exclusion of 
visibility or ease of access as evaluation criteria (ibid.). In the context of attempting to inform a 
disinterested public about local government in Ontario, this is considered a significant omission 
that will be avoided in this analysis design. 
Accordingly, a fourth category will be added to the analysis: accessibility. Cucciniello and 
Nasi (2014) spoke to the need for online content to be tailored to what the public needs and wants 





equally to content7 and presentation, such that increasing the ease with which the public can obtain 
information increases the likelihood that it will be accessed and used (Stedman, 2018). Spoken 
more plainly, providing information that the public wants and will access requires that online 
Integrity Commissioner content and access points are designed from the public’s perspective and 
not from a strict legal de minimis perspective. Since access to reliable information is taken as an 
essential component of transparency, it should be weighted somewhat more heavily than simply 
providing basic information. 
By combining these diverse strategies for analyzing the transparency of documentation in a 
governmental website, it is possible to develop a relatively robust and defensible strategy for 
scoring the online presentation of an Integrity Commissioner’s work. Very generally, these 
categories also reflect some of the key aspects of Lourenco’s framework for centralized 
repositories of open government data (2015). Combining the strategies of Veljkovic et al. (2014), 
da Cruz et al. (2016) and Cucciniello and Nasi (2014) allows for the broader categories of analysis 
to be developed and weighted. The categorical weightings are based primarily upon those used by 
Veljkovic et al., (2014), except that the category of accessibility has been added to better suit the 
research presented thus far. By retaining the relative weighting of Veljkovic et al., but taking an 
even 20% from each in order to provide weight to the added category of accessibility,8 we arrive 
at the following categories: 
 
7 Tailoring content by writing in plain language is also important in this context but will not be scored specifically. It 
will be discussed further in the recommendations section of this report. 
8 This is an admittedly arbitrary approach, but the resultant weightings do appear to be appropriate given the goals of 





1. Accessibility (20%) – An essential component of transparency, but relatively easy to 
provide. Therefore, full marks for accessibility alone should not translate into a high 
score for transparency; 
2. Basic Information (16%) – Again, easily provided information that is important to 
the public’s access, but providing it should not be an end goal of transparency; 
3. Data Utility (28%) – Predictable and well-presented content has been identified as 
essential for full transparency; 
4. Data Quality (36%) – Without comprehensive reporting to communicate the 
information that is important and useful to the public, all the preceding criteria 
become somewhat moot. 
In order to minimize bias on the part of the author in scoring the transparency criteria upon 
which the websites are to be evaluated, a very specific scoring rubric was developed. The strategies 
of da Cruz et al. (2016) considering the concept of internal trade-off are used to establish the 
relative scoring internal to each category and employing multiple metrics for enhanced 
differentiation. Each category was allotted 10 points in total to be divided between the various 
criteria, with the total points being multiplied by the category weighting in order to establish a 
category score. The sum of all categories gives the transparency score out of 10.  
𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 i 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 i  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
The following description lists the criteria developed to specifically assess Integrity 







 Does the municipality have an Integrity Commissioner webpage that could be found? 
(5 pts) – It is considered of high importance that the municipality hosts a dedicated 
webpage with content related to the Integrity Commissioner. This is a binary criterion 
where the existence of an Integrity Commissioner webpage garners full points; 
 Ability to navigate to Integrity Commissioner webpage (5 points) – This is a binary 
criterion: full points are awarded if 3 or fewer selections are required to reach the 
Integrity Commissioner webpage, or a specific accountability type webpage from which 
the respective content is obviously available; 
 If navigation is not possible or is very obscure, subtract 1 point if a search for the 
following terms, attempted in order, do not result in a link to the appropriate webpage: 
o “Integrity Commissioner”; 
o “Accountability”; 
o “Complaint”; 
o “Code of Conduct”. 
2. Basic Information (16%) 
 Who is the Integrity Commissioner? (4 points) – This may seem an obvious piece of 
information to include, but a review of municipal websites illustrates that it is commonly 
excluded. Identification of the Integrity Commissioner on a dedicated webpage gets 4 
points; 2 or more clicks beyond that page to find this information receives 2 points. 
Providing contact information on forms receives 1 point. Very obscure or no reference 





 Description of the role, mandate and limitations (4 points) - Again, useful for educating 
the public and clarifying the extent to which the Integrity Commissioner can pursue 
various issues. It is also simple boiler plate information that would take very little effort 
to include on a webpage. Incomplete descriptions receive only 1 point; 
 Link to Council Code of Conduct (2 points) – since the Code of Conduct is essential to 
establishing the expected behavioural norms, the absence of easy access to the Code on 
the webpage is considered important. Providing the code in a clear location gets 2 points, 
while including it as part of another document received only 1 point. 
3. Data Utility (28%) 
 Description of the complaints process (2 points) – If the process is not clearly defined, 
how could the general public possibly hope to navigate a fairly technical legal process? 
A clearly presented complaints process receives 2 points, while a poorly presented 
process receives 1 point. No process description at all receives zero points; 
 Annual Reports (4 points) – While not mandated by the Municipal Act, 2001, an annual 
report is considered an essential component of transparency to the public, both for 
Council conduct and financial reasons. For this reason it should be considered 
significant if annual reports are not available on the municipality’s webpage. Increasing 
difficulty in obtaining reports is considered an obstacle to transparency. If annual reports 
are available through the website’s search function or if some reports are missing only 
2 points are awarded. If it is clearly indicated that they are only available by submitting 





 Investigation Reports (4 points) – This is also considered an essential component of the 
Integrity Commissioner’s role. If all reports to Council are available on the Integrity 
Commissioner webpage or with a single (clearly identified) link, full points are awarded. 
If the annual report or the webpage clearly indicates that there were no investigations 
that required a report, full points are also awarded. If investigation reports can only be 
found through the website’s search function only 2 points are awarded. If it is clearly 
indicated that they are only available by request to the Clerk, 1 point is awarded. If it is 
not possible to establish if there were any reports, no points are awarded; 
4. Data Quality (36%) 
 Clarity of basic information (2 points) – Presenting the information is important, but as 
discussed, the format should suit the audience and purpose. This is a subjective criterion, 
but it is included to help differentiate the various websites based on the perception of 
quality of the webpage likely to be experienced by the public. Ease of use and clarity of 
information are each allocated a single point. The subjective nature of this criterion is 
not considered problematic due to the relatively small impact to overall scoring; 
 Annual report quality (8 points available). Only the quality of the current (2020) annual 
report is considered. At the time of writing, over 6 months had elapsed since the end of 
2020, which should be enough time to publish an annual report. Any longer risks 
diminishing the relevance of the information presented. If no 2020 report was available, 
a score of 0 points was awarded:  
o List of Activities (4 pts total) – This metric is given the highest importance because 





information is not included, the annual report serves very little purpose. Points are 
awarded if the annual report describes (to the level of detail permissible) what types 
of activities were undertaken (2 pts), and quantifies those activities (even if the 
amount is zero) (2 pts); 
o List of previous years’ activities (1 pt) – Providing the level of activity in previous 
years not only allows for analysis of trends in budget expenditure and ethical conduct 
but it also shows readers other years that may be worth reviewing. Not essential if all 
annual reports are readily available (which allows for a single point even if the 2020 
report is missing); 
o Budget (2 pts) – Full disclosure of the cost of providing these services allows for 
informed decision making on the part of Council and the public, but is not as essential 
for councillor accountability; 
o Description of role/mandate (1 pt) – Again, useful for educating the public and 
clarifying the extent to which the Integrity Commissioner can pursue various issues, 
but not essential for accountability. It is also simple boiler-plate information that 
would take very little effort to include in annual reports. 
 The quality of Investigation Reports was not scored due to potential inconsistencies with 
respect to the ability to divulge information due to privacy concerns. It is assumed for 
this analysis that, if an Investigation Report is available, it divulges information to the 
extent permitted.  
Each municipality’s webpage was then visited and scored based on this system. In each case, 





webpage navigation. If that was ineffective, the webpage search function was employed using the 
keywords identified. While this approach is subjective since it depends on the abilities of the 
searcher, it is assumed that this is actually a forgiving approach in this analysis since the author is 
searching with a clear knowledge of the role, appropriate keywords, etc… Members of the general 
public may not necessarily possess this knowledge, so locating this information would be even 
more difficult for them. 
It should be noted that the Annual Report and its contents are reflected in two separate 
categories: Data Utility and Data Quality. This places significant weight on the provision of 
Annual Reports, which appears appropriate given that the scoring system is meant to quantify how 
effectively the Integrity Commissioner webpages are at communicating the work of the office. In 
Data Utility, the presence of an Annual Report obtains 4 points on a weighting of 28%, or 1.12 
points overall. The Data Quality scoring for Annual Report content totals an available 8 points on 
a weighting of 36%, or 2.88 points overall. This means that the maximum score available to a 
municipality without published Annual Reports is 6 out of 10. What will be seen is that typically 
those municipalities who did not post Annual Reports, with the exception of the City of Brampton, 
also did not post other important information as well and ended up with scores well below 5. 
Therefore, not only is this double-accounting of Annual Reports somewhat appropriate given the 
importance of the document, it does not appear to have unfairly penalized otherwise transparent 
webpages. Being somewhat punitive in this evaluation is acceptable because when a municipality 
views the publication of Integrity Commissioner content as an obligation to be dealt with 
expediently it also has the potential to taint the spirit in which the services themselves are 





Limitations of the Research 
The distribution of size of municipalities in Ontario given the population thresholds selected 
led to a very small sample size that was dominated by only a few service providers. Of the sixteen 
third-party Integrity Commissioners that were identified, only six different firms were listed. This 
leads to results that are not likely to be statistically significant across all municipalities and 
therefore the usefulness of detailed statistical analysis was severely limited. However, this is the 
environment that exists under the current regime, and even this small sample size proved to be 
illustrative.  
Results: How transparent are Ontario’s Integrity Commissioners? 
Following the review of the selected municipalities’ websites the scores were tabulated in 
order to establish a relative ranking of each, compared to a maximum possible score of 10 points. 
A summary of the total transparency scores received is shown in Table 2. The complete scoring 
results are presented in Appendix A.  
Table 2 - Results of Transparency Scoring 
Municipality Tier Delivery Model Transparency Score 
City of Ottawa Single In-house 10 
Regional Municipality of 
Durham 
Upper Third party 9.64 
City of Windsor Single In-house 8.92 
City of Vaughan Lower In-house 8.64 
Regional Municipality of 
Niagara 
Upper Third party 7.52 
City of Markham Lower Third party 6.92 
City of Toronto Single In-house 6.92 
City of Mississauga Lower Third party 6.56 
City of Brampton Lower In-house 5.64 
City of Oshawa Lower Third party 5.36 
Regional Municipality of 
Waterloo 





City of Burlington Lower Third party 4.88 
City of Kitchener Lower Third party 4.88 
Regional Municipality of 
Simcoe 
Upper Third party 4.88 
Regional Municipality of York Upper Third party 4.88 
City of Greater Sudbury Single Third party 4.6 
City of London Single Third party 4.6 
City of Hamilton Single Third party 4.52 
Regional Municipality of Peel Upper Third party 4.32 
Regional Municipality of Halton Upper Third party 4.32 
City of Richmond Hill Lower Third party 4.16 
Town of Oakville Lower Third party 4.04 
The scores show a wide variation in the assessed transparency of each municipality’s online 
Integrity Commissioner content. The very high scores for Ottawa, Durham, Windsor and Vaughan 
reflect webpages that contained a complete accounting of the activities of their respective Integrity 
Commissioners, including annual reports for every year and investigation reports. The webpages 
were for the most part easy to find, and the basic information regarding the role of Integrity 
Commissioner and how the public can access it were clearly presented. At the other end of the 
spectrum, while all of the municipalities reviewed had a webpage for their Integrity Commissioner, 
many had little or no useful content, and even the identity of the Integrity Commissioner was 
sometimes difficult to locate. The low scores achieved by a significant percentage of the 
municipalities reviewed reflect that they may not even be meeting the most basic disclosure 
expected of them. 
In terms of more general observations, some of the key metrics from the scoring results are 
summarized in Table 3. It can be seen that lower tier municipalities score consistently better, but 
the average scores do not indicate a major variation between lower and upper tier municipalities 





municipality should be more predisposed to higher quality online presence than others in this 
population range. Nevertheless, the consistently higher scores for lower tier municipalities does 
perhaps warrant further investigation in future research. 
Table 3 - Transparency Scores: General Observations 
 Lower Tier Upper Tier 
Number 15 7 
In-House 5 (33%) 0 
IC Page Exists 15 (100%) 7 (100%) 
IC Clearly Identified? 14 (93%) 5 (71%) 
Annual Reports on website? 5 (33%) 2 (29%) 
Complaint Process Clear? 15 (100%) 5 (71%) 
Average Transparency Score 6.04 5.83 
  
Similarly, Figure 1 shows that within this range of populations the transparency scores 
received did not display any discernible relationship to population.  This provides some evidence 





that the sample selection strategy was effective in controlling for the size of the municipality. 
Given that neither the form nor the population of the municipality appears to influence the 
transparency scores received in a significant way, the data seems to support the idea that either the 
choices of the municipal council or the performance of the Integrity Commissioner are the more 
direct influence. 
In light of this observation, it may be more illuminating to compare the scores of 
municipalities with in-house Integrity Commissioners with those obtained by municipalities 
employing third parties for that role. Figure 2 is particularly useful in illustrating these differences. 
Figure 2 - Transparency Scores by Integrity Commissioner Delivery Model 
 
The graph of transparency scores in Figure 2 shows two clear groups of data. The first, 





appears to cluster just below a score of 5. It is possible that a score of 5 could represent an easily 
obtained threshold below which a de minimis approach to transparency on the part of the 
municipality can be inferred. Given that simply providing Annual Reports would have increased 
those scores to closer to 6, it becomes apparent that if each municipality was mandated to produce 
annual reports, the scoring system would need to be modified to provide greater resolution of 
scores in order to better compare Integrity Commissioner content. As it stands, given the widely 
varying transparency in the current environment, the scoring system developed, while coarse, is 
nonetheless effective for identifying broader tendencies.  
Of key interest for this comparison, the only municipality to receive a perfect transparency 
score was the City of Ottawa. However, that score was based on the performance of a long-serving 
and well-respected in-house Integrity Commissioner. The City has recently completed the 
procurement of Integrity Commissioner services and has decided to employ a part-time, third party 
firm for those services instead (Ottawa, 2021). Scoring the transparency of online content in the 
first years of the new regime in that city could be an informative follow-up to this research. 
Based on the preceding analysis of the results, certain key observations can be made about 
the transparency of Integrity Commissioner webpages in the selected Ontario municipalities: 
 First, the scores vary widely, but there appear to be four clear leaders in transparency, 
three are in-house Integrity Commissioners, and one is a third-party; 
 Only the top 8 municipalities obtained scores near 7 or above, while the majority appear 
to settle around a score under 5. As discussed, this could establish a starting point for 





 While in-house Integrity Commissioners seem more likely to have high transparency 
scores, it is not guaranteed. Two of five municipalities with in-house Integrity 
Commissioners have scores that are only slightly above-average;9 
 Care must be taken when drawing broad conclusions from such a small population. For 
example, of the seventeen third party municipalities scored, twelve of them were served 
by only two law firms. If those firms have set low information transparency standards, 
it could artificially skew the overall results for third parties down. 
Based on the scores obtained by the various municipalities it appears likely that, after 
controlling for technical and fiscal capacity by eliminating smaller municipalities, the form of 
municipality plays no significant role in determining how transparent their Integrity Commissioner 
content is likely to be. Municipalities that employed in-house Integrity Commissioners appear far 
more likely to obtain very high scores. Perhaps this is reflective of municipalities who value the 
role more highly, but the sample size is too small allow transferable tendencies to be inferred. The 
only conclusion that remains, then, is that the application of municipal Integrity Commissioners 
across the province of Ontario is inconsistent and is likely subject more to the choices of councils 
or their Integrity Commissioner and not due to any structural feature of the municipality. While 
not statistically significant, this conclusion nonetheless proves informative when developing 
strategies for overcoming the disparity of performances identified. 
 
9 It is important to note that one in-house Integrity Commissioner (City of Toronto) had not published their 2020 
annual report at the time of writing, which significantly lowered that overall score. However, the 2020 report would 
have been the first report under a new Integrity Commissioner, so evaluating on the basis of the previous year’s 






Section Four – What changes can ensure that municipal Integrity 
Commissioners contribute to transparency in local government? 
As described, there is very little consistency in the approach to the ways in which municipal 
Integrity Commissioners in Ontario communicate their work to the public. AMCTO, in their 2017 
submission to the Ontario Government, presciently noted:  
It is unreasonable to forcefully expand the role of the integrity commissioner without 
first setting out in legislation the basic principles for how that role should be practiced. 
If the province does not set out such basic principles, the implementation of Bill 68’s 
new powers for integrity commissioners will be characterized, not by enhanced 
accountability, transparency or good governance, but by a patchwork of approaches 
and inconsistently applied outcomes. (2017, p.10) 
 Given that the current state of communication of municipal Integrity Commissioners’ 
content has been shown to vary widely, from excellent to minimalist, it is apparent that leaving the 
decision to local municipalities, acting alone or on the advice of their retained expert third parties, 
does not result in a regime that adequately and reliably informs the public across the province. 
This result supports the findings of Cucciniello and Nasi (2014) who illustrated how municipalities 
in Italy tended towards providing just the minimum amount of information, rather than aspiring to 
some higher ideal of disclosure. 
The risk with the current state is that the public’s ability to trust the information it does 
receive is reduced, which negatively impacts the ability of Integrity Commissioners to contribute 





electoral accountability at the polls expected by Sancton (2017) and Jepson (2018). The 
“patchwork of approaches” AMCTO (2017) predicted has truly come to pass, and without any real 
barriers that can be identified. Therefore, their demand for some type of standardization of the role 
appears to be a suitable remedy. Since the focus of this paper is transparency, the location and 
format of online Integrity Commissioner content is an obvious standardization to pursue. 
Establishing a single system of standardized reporting will enhance the current contributions of 
municipal Integrity Commissioners to local government. The scoring system developed for this 
research in order to analyze the transparency of Integrity Commissioner web content provides a 
useful framework for what that system can look like. 
Standardized Webpage Content 
As described, predictable access to trustworthy data is considered a hallmark of open and 
transparent government (Gingras, 2012). In this digital age, the use of technology to provide a 
reasonable web presence and communicate electronically is taken for granted (Stedman, 2018), 
but even as early as 2001 the need for consistent format and navigation was identified (West, 
2001). This research has demonstrated that, when it comes to the potential for municipal Integrity 
Commissioner to contribute to transparency in local government through effective communication 
to the public via their municipal websites, the strategies and results are widely variable. 
Building from the scoring system that was developed, the key elements of an Integrity 
Commissioner webpage that can contribute to transparency are related to how easy the webpage 
is to find, and what content is available there. Accordingly, municipalities should be encouraged 
to establish Integrity Commissioner webpages that: 





 Are available in a predictable location to simplify navigation (as a suggestion: under 
“Council” and “Transparency” or “Accountability”); 
 Identify the Integrity Commissioner, with contact information; 
 Clearly describe the mandate of the Integrity Commissioner; 
 Contain single click links to the location where annual reports and investigation reports 
are available for viewing and download; 
 Contain a link to the Council Code of Conduct; 
 Display, or contain a link to, a clear description of the complaints process. 
As with all communication, the intended audience should always be considered (Cucciniello 
and Nasi, 2014). Websites should be constructed not for the legal professionals who dominate the 
field but for average citizens who may not necessarily understand what the role can do for them. 
Therefore, extensive use of jargon and complex descriptions should be avoided whenever possible.  
Standardized Reporting – Existence and Content 
The research also demonstrated a lack of consistency with respect to what reporting, if any, 
was available electronically. This is somewhat understandable, since the Municipal Act, 2001 is 
quite vague in this regard and lacks any sort of mandated reporting. To improve transparency 
requires only a simple mandate that each municipality must produce annual reports and separate 
reports for each investigated complaint. Further, those reports should be available from the 
municipality’s website. This would be a simple amendment to the Act, and some precedent can be 
found in other jurisdictions for a top-down management of web content (Cucciniello and Nasi, 





based on relative size that should be considered, especially since websites themselves are currently 
not mandated for municipalities. 
As for the content of the reports, the work of Veljkovic (2014) and others related to open 
government regularly identifies the utility of the data as a key determinant of its openness. In 
Stedman’s words, in order for the public to be able to contribute in an effective way to the work 
of public ethics officers, “public disclosure statements must be searchable, sortable and 
downloadable” (p. 93, 2018). This is taken to be especially applicable to annual reports, since they 
would be a logical starting point for any citizen looking to learn more about the role, activities, 
and which councillors may have been involved in any conflicts or code violations. 
As a starting point, guidelines for annual report content and format could be produced by the 
Ontario government, using the evaluation criteria employed in this study as a framework. 
Accordingly, the annual reports should contain the following information at a minimum: 
 Activities over the reporting year to the highest level of specificity permitted by privacy 
legislation; 
 Costs over the reporting year, broken down by task; 
 A comparison to prior years’ activities and costs, possibly over a five year period; 
While a description of the mandate/role of the Integrity Commissioner is also considered to be of 
value, its presence in the annual report is less important if that content is available on the webpage 
as recommended. 
Timing of all reports should also be standardized, with year-end defined within the 
Municipal Act, 2001 and selected to avoid the moratorium on investigation and reporting in the 





Of course, the development of guidelines does not necessarily address the patchwork 
approach currently seen throughout Ontario, since discretion and optional participation are 
inherent in such a strategy. In fact, research into standardized financial reporting in Ontario 
demonstrated that a mandated system still produced inconsistent report quality (Schatteman, 
2010). However, it is possible that the current inconsistency may still be due in part to the absence 
of any kind of guidance at all on the subject. From this perspective, some form of standardization 
is a reasonable first step to take as a means of building public engagement and trust in the 
institution, even if that standardization is only intended to provide minimum expectations for 
disclosure.  
Standardized Reporting - Location 
Finally, the transparency of the role from a provincial mandate perspective, not to mention 
ease of access for an interested public, would benefit from a centralized repository of Integrity 
Commissioner reports. This is supported by the literature (Lourenco, 2015). Some informal efforts 
have already been made by certain Integrity Commissioners in Ontario to achieve this end. For 
example, the Integrity Commissioner for the Region of Durham clearly demonstrated an 
appreciation of the value of such a repository when he states in his 2020 annual report that:  
…the reports of many municipal Integrity Commissioners, including me, appear on the 
public, online, Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) database, and are 
accessible for free at https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onmic/. Outside Durham Region, 
some municipalities and some Integrity Commissioners do not participate in CanLII, 
or post their reports. In my opinion, this is unfortunate; to make the results of an 





However, the CanLII website is intended primarily for legal professionals and is difficult for 
the average member of the public to navigate. There also appears to be limited ability to search by 
municipality. Instead, the Ontario Ombudsman appears to be a logical location for this 
information, especially since that office is also already associated with public complaints, 
maintaining a consistency of message. However, it would need to be clearly noted that those 
reports are not by the Ombudsman in order to maintain the benefits of locally effected 
accountability. The goal of hosting this repository with the Ombudsman would not be one of 
oversight, but rather of simplifying both the ability of the public to obtain information (either about 
their municipality or a specific councillor who may have come from another municipality) and for 
all municipalities (especially smaller ones) to reference these reports. Rather than needing to 
format and host this content, simple links can be provided and the search functions would be 
created and facilitated by the Ombudsman while the pertinent metadata (essential for effective 
searching) is input by the respective Integrity Commissioner in completing and submitting their 
reports. 10  This also retains an element of autonomy for the province’s municipalities while 
ensuring a consistent level of accountability, which is a difficult balance to achieve. 
Municipal Equity Considerations 
An obvious challenge for any province in establishing the terms for empowering 
municipalities in any role is the diversity of needs. In Ontario, 444 distinct municipalities, some 
rural, some urban, with populations varying from zero to almost 3 million are enabled by a single 
statute (Municipal Act, 2001). Clearly this diversity of needs and the associated benefits of local 
 
10 Other bodies in Ontario already operate in such a way. For example, the Ontario Information and Privacy 





control and design of service delivery can be an argument in favour of enhanced autonomy for 
what many feel are already established and mature levels of government (Sancton, 2015). For the 
purposes of this paper, however, this diversity simply highlights that one-size-fits-all approaches 
to provincially mandated accountability officers may not deliver consistent value propositions for 
each municipality. For example, costs associated with singular deliverable metrics can be expected 
to impact smaller municipalities disproportionately (AMCTO, 2015). However, the proposal for 
standardized Integrity Commissioner reporting can also provide benefits for both small and large 
municipalities. 
AMCTO raised concerns in their response to Bill 68 about the potential for mandatory 
reporting measures to unduly impact the operating budgets of smaller municipalities (2017). While 
this was not researched, it is considered to be a reasonable expectation. Smaller municipalities 
simply do not have the tax bases or staff levels to be able to seamlessly integrate enhanced 
reporting requirements (AMCTO, 2015). However, there are certain elements of standardization 
that can help mitigate the impact to these smaller centres. 
A randomized review of certain smaller municipalities was undertaken that identified an 
interesting trend: amongst smaller municipalities (none of whom had in-house integrity 
commissioners, as would be expected), those that had any reasonable public accounting of the role 
of Integrity Commissioner were the municipalities that had enhanced their procurement and 
funding capacity by partnering with either neighbouring municipalities of similar size, or with their 
associated upper tier municipality. In those cases, a single Integrity Commissioner provided 
services to all member municipalities, sometimes producing a single annual report that can easily 





model for ensuring quality delivery of service and public availability of Integrity Commissioner 
content without unfairly impacting the budgets of smaller municipalities. 
In addition to economies of scale, establishing stricter guidelines surrounding the form and 
content of Integrity Commissioner deliverables could actually introduce some cost certainty into 
the procurement process. Effectively, the base amounts of any assignment become very well 
defined, including annual reports and council education sessions. This then allows for the 
development of defined and competitive retainers and permits municipalities to assign whatever 
value they deem appropriate to hourly rates and other factors listed in Integrity Commissioner 
proposals. The relative benefits of various procurement strategies would be a worthwhile area of 
investigation for future research, not only for Integrity Commissioners but for other mandated 
municipal roles that may not be practical for smaller municipalities to implement individually. 
The assumption that large municipalities have greater means and access to expertise to create 
and maintain web content is integral to this research. On that basis, the burden of provincially 
mandated transparency for Integrity Commissioners is expected to be negligible in relation to the 
resources available to these larger centres. The benefits for Ontario’s larger municipalities are 
better assessed in terms of the more theoretical aspects discussed in this paper, those being 
enhanced visibility of the role with the potential to contribute to public engagement and political 
accountability for elected officials. However, larger municipalities would still also benefit from 






Consideration of a Standards Body for Integrity Commissioners 
While there is no formal body responsible for standards or advocacy on the part of Integrity 
Commissioners, the 2019 annual report of the City of Toronto Integrity Commissioner makes 
reference to the Municipal Integrity Commissioners of Ontario: “The Commissioner attended two 
meetings of the Municipal Integrity Commissioners of Ontario ("MICO"), which is a gathering of 
integrity commissioners from municipalities across the province. This growing, informal group of 
practitioners in the field of municipal ethics and integrity is an invaluable resource to the Office 
and will play a key role in developing a core set of best practices for municipal integrity 
commissioners in Canada” (Toronto, 2019: p. 40). As an alternative to amending the Municipal 
Act to enforce standardization of Integrity Commissioner practices, this informal group could be 
formalized as a non-legislated means to achieve the same end. A body that brings practitioners 
together could provide an appropriate forum within which to establish accepted standards of 
practice while also providing a convenient location for the centralized repository for Integrity 
Commissioner reports proposed previously. 
Conclusion 
In the end, the question really does come down to this: who’s watching, and does anybody 
know? Because municipalities remain creatures of the province, oversight of municipalities still 
rests with the government of Ontario. The Province has mandated that all municipalities, at their 
own cost, hire Integrity Commissioners to be available as a resource to municipal councillors and 
ultimately to provide some accountability of those elected officials, delegating a part of the 
oversight mandate to local governments. Arguments have been made that some of what the 





in search of a problem” (p.4, AMCTO, 2017), but the fact remains that the values that Integrity 
Commissioners uphold are still things that each individual municipality has determined to be 
important in their local government, and the inconsistency of approach to public information has 
rendered Integrity Commissioners a solution with missed opportunity.  
Enhanced transparency can make significant contributions to the accountability and 
effectiveness of local government, and the literature suggests that those contributions can be 
expected to be universally beneficial. Unfortunately, the wide variability in the quality and 
accessibility of Integrity Commissioner documentation across the twenty-two municipalities 
reviewed demonstrates that consistent transparency is not being achieved under the current 
framework. Perhaps a tighter definition and regulation of the role and its products is therefore 
justified. 
Implementing more strictly defined regulatory requirements is a fine line to walk for the 
Province. While the theoretical goals of increased transparency and the resultant accountability 
may justify the action, incorporating more prescriptive measures into the Municipal Act, 2001 has 
the potential to infringe on municipal autonomy by limiting a council’s ability to pick and pay for 
the services they choose. Imposing stringent reporting requirements also has the potential to 
increase base costs for the service that could negatively impact smaller municipalities. On the other 
hand, this research has shown a propensity for municipalities employing third-party Integrity 
Commissioners to fall short with respect to transparency goals, regardless of population.11 The 
 
11 Noting that there are obviously exceptions. Third-party Integrity Commissioner Guy Giorno has facilitated an 
excellent online presence for the Regional Municipality of Durham. Oddly, the City of Oshawa partners with 





example of the City of Ottawa provides an ideal opportunity to test this theory. Time will tell if 
the trend identified in this research for reduced transparency in third party Integrity Commissioners 
is borne out, but what is clear is that without defined quality guidelines the result remains very 
much in doubt. 
There is also an additional academic and public service benefit of defined minimum 
reporting requirements. By minimizing variation across municipalities in terms of what documents 
are published, an in-depth review of the actual content becomes more informative. It is not difficult 
to see that, as a next phase of academic exploration, such a content-focused analysis would speak 
much more directly to the benefits of transparent government espoused by the literature, bringing 
the study closer to analyzing the impacts of Integrity Commissioners’ work on the communities 
they serve. 
As Sancton (2017) and Jepson (2018) observe, political accountability remains the ultimate 
tool that the public has at its disposal in order to ensure that citizens get the representation that 
they want in local government. Transparency of government has been shown to increase trust and 
engagement, applied in both the federal and local government contexts (Kassen, 2013). As this 
research has demonstrated, the role that Integrity Commissioners in Ontario’s largest 
municipalities play in contributing to transparency of government is inconsistent, and at times 
ineffective.  
While enhanced municipal autonomy remains a worthy goal, the availability of discretion 
on the part of municipalities in how the work of their Integrity Commissioners is communicated 
has resulted in an overall poor embodiment of transparent government and therefore misses out on 





implementation of some of the recommendations presented in this paper is expected to enhance 
the consistent transparency of the role of municipal Integrity Commissioners in Ontario, increasing 
its ability to contribute to their communities by reliably and effectively communicating their work 
to the voting public. Without transparency, these mandated accountability officers will continue 
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Appendix A – Transparency Scoring Sheet: Full Results 
Transparency Scoring Sheet - Selected Ontario Municipalities
Weight Weight Weight Weight








































































Toronto in house Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 Partial 2 Yes 4 8 2.24 Good 2 0 1 0 0 3 1.08 6.92
Ottawa in house Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 10 2.8 Good 2 4 1 2 1 10 3.6 10
Mississauga third party Yes 5 2 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 Partial 2 Yes 4 8 2.24 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 6.56
Brampton in house Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 No 0 Yes 4 6 1.68 Fair 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.36 5.64
Hamilton third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 No 0 No 0 2 0.56 Good 2 0 0 0 0 1 0.36 4.52
London third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 1 No 0 No 0 1 0.28 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 4.6
Markham third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 Partial 2 Yes 4 8 2.24 Good 2 0 1 0 0 3 1.08 6.92
Vaughan in house Yes 5 - 0 0 0 5 1 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 10 2.8 Good 2 4 0 2 1 9 3.24 8.64
Kitchener third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 No 0 No 0 2 0.56 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 4.88
Windsor in house Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 10 2.8 Fair 1 4 1 0 1 7 2.52 8.92
Richmond Hill third party Yes 5 - 0 0 0 5 1 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 No 0 No 1 3 0.84 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 4.16
Oakville third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Form 1 Yes 4 Yes 2 7 1.12 Clear 2 No 0 No 0 2 0.56 Fair 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.36 4.04
Burlington third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 2 No 0 No 0 2 0.56 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 4.88
Greater Sudbury third party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 1.6 Clear 1 No 0 No 0 1 0.28 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 4.6
Oshawa third party Yes 5 5 0 0 0 5 1 Yes 4 Partial 1 Yes 2 7 1.12 Clear 2 Partial 2 Yes 5 9 2.52 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.72 5.36
Peel Third Party Yes 5 2 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 1 Vague 1 Yes 2 4 0.8 Vague 1 No 0 Yes 5 6 1.2 Poor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
York Third Party Yes 5 2 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 2 Clear 2 No 0 No 0 2 0.4 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.4 4.8
Durham Third Party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 2 Clear 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 10 2 Good 2 3 1 2 1 9 1.8 7.8
Halton Third Party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 2 None 0 No 0 No 0 0 0 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.4 4.4
Waterloo Third Party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 No 0 Yes 4 Yes 2 6 1.2 Clear 2 No 0 Yes 5 7 1.4 Fair 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 4.8
Niagara Third Party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 No 0 Yes 4 Yes 2 6 1.2 Clear 2 Yes 2 Yes 2 6 1.2 Fair 1 3 1 2 1 8 1.6 6
Simcoe Third Party Yes 5 3 5 0 0 10 2 Yes 4 Yes 4 Yes 2 10 2 Clear 2 No 0 No 0 2 0.4 Good 2 0 0 0 0 2 0.4 4.8
Upper Tier
Accessibility Basic Information Data Utility Data Quality
Quality of Annual Report
Single/Lower Tier
